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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Craig A. Willey appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, for possession 
of methamphetamine.  Willey specifically challenges the district court’s refusal to 
instruct the jury pursuant to ICJI 1510 on the defense of ignorance or mistake of fact. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
 
 The following testimony was presented at trial: 
 After being stopped by Mountain Home Police Officer Scott Smith and being 
informed that his taillight was out, Willey got out of his car and went to the rear of it.  
(Tr., p.125, L.3 – p.128, L.20.)  The officer noticed that Willey appeared nervous, was 
fidgety, had a little sweat on his forehead, and kept looking around with his eyes 
darting – leading the officer to suspect Willey was possibly under the influence “of 
something.”  (Tr., p.129, L.17 – p.130, L.23.)  Willey got back in his car but, while Officer 
Smith called for backup, Willey got back out of the car and started to run.  (Tr., p.130, 
L.24 - p.131, L.13.)  Officer Smith pursued Willey down an alley yelling “stop” and that 
he would “get Tased” if he did not.  (Tr., p.131, Ls.16-22.)  As the officer chased Willey, 
he noticed Willey’s hands “were up toward the front” of his waistband area as he ran.  
(Tr., p.131, L.25 – p.132, L.7.)  Willey continued to run down the alley and behind a 
house, and the officer ordered him to get on the ground.  (Tr., p.131, L.16 – p.133, 
L.19.)  After Willey refused the officer’s commands, the officer used his Taser to get him 
on the ground and handcuffed him.  (Tr., p.133, L.14 – p.136, L.6.)   Paramedics were 
called to check on Willey’s medical condition, and after they cleared him, Willey was 
taken to jail.   (Tr., p.140, Ls.3-13.)  
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 During a search of Willey’s pockets, Officer Smith seized two glass pipes.  (Tr., 
p.137, L.24 – p.138, L.3.)  One had a bulb on the end which had a little hole that was 
partially broken off, which had “a streak of residue in it” but looked pretty clean.  (Tr., 
p.137, L.24 – p.138, L.16; p.140, Ls.1-2.)  The other pipe “was a long, straight glass 
tube and it had a black and sort of white residue in it.”  (Tr., p.138, Ls.17-19.)  Officer 
Smith testified that, based on his training and experience, the pipes are used to ingest 
drugs, usually methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.138, L.4 – p.139, L.5.)  Idaho State Police 
Forensic Scientist Corinna Owsley subsequently tested residue from one of the two 
pipes seized from Willey’s pocket and determined it was methamphetamine.  (Tr., 
p.200, L.12 – p.205, L.20.)  
 Willey testified at trial that, on the day of his arrest, he had been in Baker, 
Oregon, helping acquaintances pack up their belongings to move to Mountain Home.  
(Tr., p.240, L.2 – p.241, L.22.)  Even though he was on felony probation in Oregon and 
not allowed to leave the state, he decided to go with his friends as they moved to 
Mountain Home.  (Tr., p.240, L.19 – p. 241, L.25.)  Willey explained that he had the two 
glass tubes that are “used for meth” in his pocket, but that he had not used them for that 
purpose.  (Tr., p.242, L.21 – p.243, L.8.)  According to Willey, he obtained the pipes the 
day before the Idaho move, and he kept them to re-blow them, explaining, “I’m an artist 
and I blow glass.  I do make glass roses and everything else.  I don’t make just 
paraphernalia.”  (Tr., p.243, Ls.9-16.)  Willey admitted that he also makes paraphernalia 
with his glass blowing.  (Tr., p.243, Ls.17-18.)  Willey testified that, the day before he left 
Oregon to drive to Idaho, he heated up the glass pipes and cleaned them out to an 
extent that he thought they no longer contained any methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.244, L.4 
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– 249, L.2.)  Willey explained that the reason he ran from Officer Smith during the traffic 
stop was because he did not have a driver’s license and he failed to ask his probation 
officer if he could leave the state.  (Tr., p.246, L.24 – p.247, L.2.)   
 The state charged Willey with (1) possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), (2) driving without privileges, (3) obstructing and/or delaying an 
officer, and (4) possession of drug paraphernalia.  (Tr., pp.32-34.)  Prior to trial, the 
state filed a motion to dismiss the charge of driving without privileges (R., pp.113-114), 
which was subsequently granted (R., pp.186-187).  At trial, and at the end of the 
presentation of testimony, Willey’s trial counsel requested the court to instruct the jury 
pursuant to ICJI 1510 on a “mistake of fact” defense, and the court denied that request 
after a lengthy discussion.  (See generally Tr., p.254, L.8 – p.262, L.23; p.272, L.3 - 
p.276, L.20.)   The jury found Willey guilty of the three remaining counts (R., pp.152-
154), and the court sentenced him to a unified four years, with two years fixed, for 
possession of a controlled sentence (methamphetamine), and concurrent local jail 
sentences (201 days each) on the two misdemeanor charges (R., pp.193-196).  Willey 
filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence (R., pp.197-198), which was denied (R., 
pp.217-221).  Willey timely appealed.  (R., pp.199-202.)  
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ISSUE 
 
 Willey states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court commit reversible error by rejecting Mr. Willey’s 
mistake of fact defense instruction? 
 
(Appellant’s Brief, p.4.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
 
 Has Willey failed to show error in the district court’s refusal to give a “mistake of 
fact” jury instruction pursuant to ICJI 1510? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
Willey Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Refusal To Give A “Mistake Of 
Fact” Jury Instruction Pursuant To ICJI 1510 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Willey claims the district court erred in denying his request for an instruction 
based on ICJI 1510, the “mistake of fact” defense instruction.1  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-
12.)  According to Willey, a mistake of fact instruction pursuant to ICJI 1510 was 
required because his defense at trial was that he believed the pipes he possessed did 
not contain methamphetamine.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.5.)  Willey’s claim fails.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this Court 
exercises free review.  State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 
(2009).  “An error in jury instructions only constitutes reversible error when the 
instruction misled the jury or prejudiced the party challenging the instruction.”  Id. 
(citation omitted).  “If the instructions, considered as a whole, fairly and adequately 
present the issues and state the applicable law, then no error has been committed.”  Id. 
(quotations, citation and brackets omitted). 
                                            
1  ICJI 1510, entitled “IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF FACT DEFENSE,” states: 
 
 For the defendant to be guilty of [name of offense], the state must 
prove the defendant had a particular intent.  Evidence was offered that at 
the time of the alleged offense the defendant [was ignorant of] [or] 
[mistakenly believed] certain facts.  You should consider such evidence in 
determining whether the defendant had the required intent.  
 
   If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the 
defendant had such intent, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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C.  Willey’s Argument That The Trial Court Erred By Not Instructing The Jury 
Pursuant To ICJI 1510 Fails Because The Instruction Was Covered By Other 
Instructions And It Applies Only To Specific Intent Offenses 
 
 “A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all matters of 
law necessary for the jury’s information.”  Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430.  
“This necessarily includes instructions on the ‘nature and elements of the crime charged 
and the essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has been admitted.’”  
Id. (citing State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2004)).  It also 
includes, when requested, instructions on “every defense or theory of the defense 
having any support in the evidence.”  State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 633, 38 P.3d 
1285, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 328, 986 P.2d 346, 
351 (Ct. App. 1999)).  Although “[e]ach party is entitled to request the delivery of 
specific instructions,” “such instructions will be given [only] if they are ‘correct and 
pertinent.’”  Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430.  “A proposed instruction is not 
‘correct and pertinent’ if it is (1) an erroneous statement of the law; (2) adequately 
covered by other instructions; or (3) ‘not supported by the facts of the case.’”  Severson, 
147 Idaho at 710-11, 215 P.3d at 430-31 (citing State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 285, 647 
P.2d 734, 741 (1982)). 
 Willey’s claim that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the 
defense of mistake of fact pursuant to ICJI 1510 is unavailing.  The proposed instruction 
was not “correct and pertinent” because (1) it was adequately covered by other 
instructions, and (2) by its very terms, ICJI 1510 applies only where the state has the 
burden of proving a defendant had a “particular” (i.e., specific) intent – which is not an 
element required for proving possession of a controlled substance.   
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 On appeal, Willey argues that “ICJI 1510 is applicable to any offense in which a 
mistake of fact may negate the intent element of the offense.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.9 
(capitalization modified).)2  Willey’s argument fails because it does not refute the fact 
that because Jury Instruction No. 14 (R., p.172) contains a “knowledge” element, the 
jury’s finding that he “knew” (id., ¶4) the substance was methamphetamine or a 
controlled substance necessarily negated his “mistake of fact” defense.  Further, Willey 
ignores the significance of the language in ICJI 1510 about “particular intent,” which 
shows it applies only to specific intent crimes – not to general intent crimes such as 
possession of a controlled substance. 
  
1. Willey’s Proposed Mistake Of Fact Instruction Was Adequately Covered 
By Other Instructions 
 
 The offense of possession of a controlled substance is set forth in I.C. § 37-
2732(c)(1), as follows: 
                                            
2  Willey contends that one of the cases cited in the Comment section to ICJI 1510, 
State v. Stiffler, 117 Idaho 405, 788 P.2d 220 (1990) (statutory rape not a specific intent 
crime, and “mistake of fact” about victim’s age is not a defense), “does not necessarily 
stand for the proposition that the ignorance or mistake of fact defense is only a defense 
to a specific intent crime,” and even if it does, it has been overruled by State v. 
Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 945 P.2d 1 (1997), and State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 356 
P.3d 368 (2015).  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-11.)  Willey’s argument is irrelevant.  Although 
Lamphere and McKean involve general intent crimes with a “knowledge” requirement 
subject to a “mistake of fact” defense, the issue in those cases was whether the 
proffered testimony (Lamphere) and evidence (McKean) were relevant to support the 
defense – ICJI 1510 was not mentioned in either case.  See generally Lamphere, 130 
Idaho 630, 945 P.2d 1; McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 356 P.3d 368.  It is undisputed that 
Willey was entitled to present, in some manner, a “mistake of fact” defense to his 
offense of possession of a controlled substance.  The relevant questions are (1) 
whether the “knowledge” element in Jury Instruction No. 14 (see R., p.172, ¶4) 
adequately addressed that defense, and (2) in any event, whether the court correctly 
refused to give the ICJI 1510 instruction because its language limits its application to 
specific intent crimes.     
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(c) It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless 
the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid 
prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. 
 
(1) Any person who violates this subsection and has in his 
possession a controlled substance classified in schedule I which is a 
narcotic drug or a controlled substance classified in schedule II, is guilty of 
a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than seven 
(7) years, or fined not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or 
both. 
 
 Consistent with this statutory provision, the Idaho Supreme Court has approved 
ICJI 403, entitled “Possession of a Controlled Substance,” which states: 
 In order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, the state must prove each of the following: 
 
 1.  On or about [date] 
 2.  in the state of Idaho 
 3. the defendant [name] possessed any amount of [name of 
substance], and 
 4. the defendant either knew it was [name of substance] or 
believed it was a controlled substance. 
 
 If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty.  If each of the above has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The Comment to ICJI 403, relying on State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 
866 P.2d 181 (1993), explains that because I.C. § 37-2732(c) “does not set forth any 
mental state as an element of the crime of possession of a controlled substance,” and 
because “I.C. § 18-114 only requires a general intent,” the offense “only requires a 
general intent, that is, the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance.”   ICJI 
403, Comment ¶¶ 3, 6; see State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 945 P.2d 1 (1997); State 
v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 356 P.3d 368 (2015) (possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to deliver is a general intent crime).  The “knowledge” requirement is clearly 
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set forth in ICJI 403’s fourth element.  Additionally, in defining “possession,” ICJI 421 
reinforces the “knowledge” requirement, stating, “A person has possession of something 
if the person knows of its presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and 
intention to control it.”  During Willey’s trial, the district court instructed the jury in 
accordance with both ICJI 403 and ICJI 421.  (R., pp.172 (Instr. 14), 174 (Instr. 16).)    
 The “knowledge” element of Instruction No. 14 is tantamount to requiring a 
determination of whether Willey was ignorant or mistaken about whether he possessed 
a controlled substance.3  By its verdict of “guilty,” the jury found beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Willey “either knew it was methamphetamine or a controlled substance.” 
(R., p.172.)  Such a “knowledge” determination conversely shows that the jury found 
Willey was not ignorant or mistaken about the fact that he possessed a controlled 
                                            
3  The district court appears to have recognized that fact, explaining: 
 
 Anderson really doesn’t stand for the proposition that 1510 is an 
appropriate jury instruction.  What it stands for is that the State – and this 
has been the law for quite some time – the State is – must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that, in fact, the defendant knew what it was that he 
possessed or that it was a controlled substance.  That’s what it really 
stands for.  And that – and they also ruled that the jury instructions, the 
very same jury instructions that we are using here, was – they were 
sufficient to explain to the jury that it was, in fact, the burden on the State 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  Knowledge is an element of the 
crime.  So I’m not going to give it.  . . .  But as I understand the 
defendant’s testimony, he is testifying that he, in fact, did not know that it 
was there, that he had cleaned it, and, therefore, he did not believe it 
would have any trace of methamphetamine.  That’s up to the jury to 
decide if they believe that.  That’s going to be their decision. 
 
(Tr., p.272, L.15 – p.273, L.12 (emphasis added).)  The court acknowledged it 
incorrectly said “Anderson” instead of “Armstrong.”  (Tr., p.274, L.23 – p.275, L.2.)  See 
State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 122 P.3d 321 (Ct. App. 2005) (the jury instructions, 
one of which required proof the defendant “knew it was methamphetamine or believed it 
to be another controlled substance” presented a correct statement of the law). 
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substance.  See State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 64, 122 P.3d 321, 323 (Ct. App. 
2005) (“If the instructions taken as a whole and not individually fairly and adequately 
present  the issues, state the applicable law, and do not mislead the jury or prejudice a 
party, then there is no reversible error.”).  The instructions taken as a whole, and 
especially Instruction No. 14 which required the state to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt “the defendant knew it was methamphetamine or a controlled substance” (R., 
p.172), adequately covered Willey’s “mistake of fact” defense.   
 Moreover, because the fourth element of possession of a controlled substance 
under I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) required a showing that Willey had knowledge that he 
possessed methamphetamine or a controlled substance (see id.), he fully contested that 
element with his “mistake of fact” defense by testifying he did not know the pipes had 
methamphetamine on them because he cleaned them the day before he entered Idaho 
from Oregon.  (See Tr., p.242, L.21 – p.244, L.23; p.247, Ls.9-12; p.248, L.22 – p.249, 
L.2.)  Similarly, Willey’s trial counsel’s main theme during closing argument was that the 
state failed to meet its burden of proving Willey knowingly possessed 
methamphetamine.  (See Tr., p.295, Ls.16-20; p.297, Ls.18-25; p.302, L.11 – p.304, 
L.11.)   
 In sum, because the “knowledge” element of Instruction 14 (see R., p.172) 
adequately addressed Willey’s “mistake of fact” defense, and because that defense was 
fully presented and argued by Willey at trial, the trial court did not err in declining to give 
Willey’s proposed instruction. 
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2. The District Court Correctly Ruled That ICJI 1510 Only Applies To Specific 
Intent Crimes 
 
 The district court rejected Willey’s request that the jury be given the ICJI 1510 
“mistake of fact” instruction, not only because it was adequately covered by the 
“knowledge” element of the charge itself, but also because the language of ICJI 1510 
limits its application to specific intent crimes.  That possession of a controlled substance 
is a general intent crime cannot seriously be challenged.  The district court explained: 
 I understand that, but every single time the Idaho Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has addressed whether the possession of a 
controlled substance is specific intent or general intent, they have ruled 
that it is a general intent crime.  You just have to have intended the action.  
And so that’s why I find that it’s not a specific intent crime. 
 
(Tr., p.276, L.13-20); see Lamphere, 130 Idaho at 633, 945 P.2d at 4 (citing Fox, 124 
Idaho at 926, 866 P.2d at 183) (Possession of a controlled substance “is a general 
intent crime, i.e., an offense requiring only the knowledge that one is in possession of 
the substance.”).  
 In determining that the language employed by ICJI 1510 relates to specific intent 
crimes only, the court explained: 
   But I will just point out that even the language of 1510 starts out 
with in order to find – something about the – him guilty, that you have to – 
of this crime, of the crime possession of a controlled substance, it requires 
that you proved the specific intent and that is not the case law.  So that’s 
the reason I don’t find 1510 applies, among other things. 
 
(Tr., p.275, L.20 – p.276, L.2.)  The district court correctly pointed out that the language 
of ICJI 1510 refers to specific intent, although phrased as “particular” intent.  See ICJI 
1510 (stating in relevant parts: “the state must prove the defendant had a particular 
intent.  . . . You should consider such evidence in determining whether the defendant 
had the required intent. . . . If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt 
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whether the defendant had such intent, you must find the defendant not guilty.”).  As the 
court correctly concluded, the language of ICJI 1510 applies to specific intent crimes, 
and because possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime, it would 
have been improper to give the jury such an instruction.  Indeed, ICJI 1510 requires a 
jury to “find the defendant not guilty” if it had a reasonable doubt whether the defendant 
had the “particular” intent required.  Inasmuch as possession of a controlled substance 
has no specific intent element, ICJI 1510 would effectively tell the jury that it could not 
find a defendant guilty of the crime.  Based on the inapplicability of ICJI 1510 to general 
intent crimes, the district court correctly refused Willey’s request to give such instruction.  
See State v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 89, 831 P.2d 555, 557 (1992) (a requested 
instruction need not be given if it is contrary to the law). 
 
3. If The Trial Court Erred In Not Giving ICJI 1510, The Error Was Harmless 
 
Even if the trial court erred by not giving a mistake of fact instruction pursuant to 
ICJI 1510, such error was harmless.  An instructional error is harmless where it is “clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty 
absent the error.”  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999); see also State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).  Applying this standard to the 
facts of this case, there are several reasons this Court can easily conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that, had ICJI 1510 been given, the jury still would have found Willey 
guilty of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine).   
The instructions given required the jury to find that Willey “knew” that the 
substance he possessed “was methamphetamine or a controlled substance.” 
(R., p.172.)  In finding that element true, the jury necessarily rejected Willey’s “mistake 
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of fact” defense.  Because there is no circumstance in which Willey could have known 
he possessed methamphetamine or a controlled substance, and yet been ignorant or 
mistaken about the substance being methamphetamine or a controlled substance, any 
error in not giving ICJI 1510 was necessarily harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 Secondly, by finding Willey guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia, the jury 
determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he “used, or possessed with the intent to 
use, two glass pipes intending to ingest, inhale and/or introduce into the human body a 
controlled substance.”  (R., p.177 (Jury Instr. No. 19.)  By its finding that Willey 
possessed the glass pipes for the specific purpose of ingesting a controlled substance, 
the jury necessarily rejected his argument that because he (allegedly) was going to use 
the pipes for glass-blowing material or stock, he cleaned them for that purpose before 
he entered Idaho.        
 Finally, the “Statement of Facts,” supra, outlines the testimony and evidence 
presented at trial showing Willey’s guilt.  By attempting to flee from Officer Smith, Willey 
displayed a consciousness of guilt from which a reasonable juror would conclude that 
Willey knew the substance on the glass pipes he had in his pocket was 
methamphetamine or a controlled substance.  Even if the district court had instructed 
the jury on “mistake of fact” pursuant to ICJI 1510, there was overwhelming evidence to 
support Willey’s conviction.  The state relies on those facts to show that any error in 
refusing to give ICJI 1510 was harmless.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Willey’s judgment of 
conviction for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), obstructing 
and/or resisting an officer, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  
 DATED this 22nd day of July, 2016. 
 
         
 /s/ John C. McKinney____________________ 
 JOHN C. McKINNEY 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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